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U N D E R S TA N D I N G T H E
S T RU C T U R E O F




The Origins and Use of the Social
Network Perspective
..........................................................................................................................................
The social network perspective refers to a tradition in social science which focuses
on the joint activities of, and continual exchanges between, participants in a social
system. This perspective is characterized by an interest in the recurrent relationship
patterns that connect the actors that make up a system’s social structure. (See
Wellman 1988 and Freeman 2004 for detailed explanations of the origins of this
perspective.) What we now consider the social network approach is a combination
of ideas drawn from the structuralist network tradition (Berkowitz 1982; Wellman
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and Berkowitz 1988) and more recent thinking, particularly the embeddedness (Gra-
novetter 1985) and social capital perspectives (Burt 2005).
Probably the single most important concept in a social network approach is the
relationship among actors, be they individuals or in groups such as whole organiza-
tions or parts of organizations. Rather than examining actors in isolation, the social
network perspective sees actors as embedded within networks of interconnected
relationships that provide opportunities for, as well as constraints on, behaviour.
The focus is on the interaction between actors rather than on the attributes of
particular actors, their size for example. Thus the social network perspective rep-
resents a move ‘away from individualist, essentialist and atomistic explanations
toward more relational, contextual and systematic understanding’ (Borgatti and
Foster 2003: 991).
A considerable number of ideas, concepts, and research questions which we will
introduce below have unfolded from this essential notion. We look briefly at some
of them. (For more comprehensive overviews, see Borgatti and Foster 2003; Brass
et al. 2004; Kilduff and Tsai 2003; Baker and Faulkner 2002; Kilduff et al. 2006.)
As we have said, it is the relationships between actors and not their attributes
which is important. This is the ‘core belief that underlies modern social network
analysis’, as Freeman (2004: 16) has put it. As a result, considerable work has gone
into characterizing and specifying these relationships. The key components of a
social network approach are: actors, ties and dyads, egocentric network, complete
network, positional properties of actors in networks, and structural properties
of networks. These elements will be central to our discussion. Let us provide a
short introduction to these concepts for those who are not familiar with the social
network approach.
Actors in networks, also called nodes or vertices, can be persons or teams,
organizations, countries, regions, and so on. In the field of inter-organizational
relations we focus, by definition, on relationships between organizations. Inter-
organizational relationships will, however, often be measured at a different level,
for instance at that of individuals in the case of an interlocking directorate, when a
person affiliated with one organization also sits on the board of directors of another
organization (Mizruchi 1996).
Another salient issue in a social network approach is the identification of actors,
that is who is a part of a network, and who is not, the so-called issue of boundary
specification. The answer to this question can influence considerably the structural
properties of the network. For instance, including only companies of a certain
minimum size in an innovation network runs the risk of excluding the most central
player, say a small company that recently introduced a radical innovation, thus
producing an unreliable picture of the structure of the innovation network.
Two strategies are commonly used to specify the boundary of networks, a nom-
inalist strategy and a realist strategy, though the two can be combined (see Knoke
and Laumann 1982). A nominalist strategy defines the boundaries in terms of the
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interest of a researcher or of a policy-maker, for example who is the central player in
a certain industry or among Fortune 500 companies. A realist strategy defines the
boundaries in terms of what network participants in a specific situation themselves
think are the boundaries of the network in a specific situation, for example a
network of those who believe that they influence the decision whether a given drug
is approved.
We said earlier that relationships among actors are probably the central concept
in a social network approach. These ties are also called relations, lines, or edges.
Dyadic ties connect pairs of actors and define the substantive relationships that
exist between ego (the focal organization) and the alters (those related to ego).
They can range from friendships and social contacts to formal contracts, work-
ing relationships, giving and/or receiving advice, interlocking directorates, etc. In
contrast to arm’s-length market relationships, which can also be considered ties,
the relationships in a network approach are relatively stable, although less so than
in a hierarchy. It is clear that any dyad or network is constituted of multiple types
of relationships. What is important, however, is what the researcher expects to find
useful for understanding important actor and system behaviour. For instance, if a
researcher is interested in the degree of cohesion in a knowledge network, he will
collect data on the degree to which actors know what somebody else in the network
knows and not on the formal relationships. Not only the type of relationship is
important but also whether they are directed, for example advice-giving, or undi-
rected, informal communication for instance, and what the extent of the tie is. For
the most part, the magnitude of the tie is, however, measured dichotomously, that
is by the presence or absence of a tie. Tie strength can also be potentially measured
in a more detailed way by assigning scalar values to each existing dyad to reflect the
relative strength or weakness of a tie. Granovetter’s 1973 classic article, ‘The Strength
of Weak Ties’, in which he demonstrates that weak ties actually provide the strongest
pathways to finding a job, provides a good example. Tie strength being defined
as the combination of time, emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal
services which characterize the tie (Granovetter 1973).
The notable strength of the social network approach is that it goes beyond the
sole consideration of dyads to that of the sum of the dyads. The social network
approach’s particular strength is that it has developed a considerable number of
measures of system connectedness which describe the structural properties of net-
works. According to Emirbayer and Goodwin the principal achievement of network
analysis ‘has been to transform a merely metaphorical understanding of the embed-
dedness of actors in networks of social relationships into a more precise and usable
tool for social analysis’ (1994: 1446). It is now possible to operationalize and measure
the relational and structural properties of social and organizational systems and
the encompassing units by collecting data on virtually any social relation between
units. A consequence of all this is that a network has become a variable. Rather than
using the network concept metaphorically, we are now able to distinguish different
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types of networks and network structures, based on the presence and absence of
relationships, and we can thus demonstrate that different outcomes can be expected
given the configuration of the network.
The structure of relations among actors in the network has consequences both
for individual units in the network and for the system as a whole. Many measures
are available to describe the structural position of actors within networks, such as
centrality, distance, structural equivalence, etc., as well as the structural properties
of the network as a whole, including volume, density, centralization, cliques, and so
forth (see Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Even more importantly, we now have a vast number of studies that demonstrate
the significance of the positional properties of actors in networks and structural
properties of the whole network on a myriad of outcomes. (For reviews of the
organizational literature on this topic see Borgatti and Foster 2003; Brass et al. 2004;
Kilduff and Tsai 2003; Baker and Faulkner 2002; Oliver and Ebers 1998; Freeman
2004; and Kilduff et al. 2006). In addition, the descriptive structuralist network
approach has been further validated by important theoretical developments, espe-
cially social capital and embeddedness theories (see e.g. Burt 2005).
As observed by Borgatti and Foster (2003), the social capital concept helped to
fuel interest in social networks. Social capital is, in the most general sense, a measure
for an actor of the value of his social connections (see also, Nahapiet, Chapter 22 this
volume). Although it is clear that the concept underlies the importance of relations
between actors, mainly from a resource perspective, social capital itself can also be
considered from a more genuine social network perspective. Both Burt (1992) and
Coleman (1990) have introduced a topological view of social capital that emphasizes
the importance of the interconnections among the members of a whole network.
While Burt focuses traditionally on the absence and presence of links among the al-
ters of a specific ego in the network (the so-called brokerage perspective), Coleman
concentrates on the absence and presence of links among all network participants
(the so-called closure perspective). From a brokerage perspective (Burt), an actor
or a dyad in a network can derive control benefits from being situated between
two other organizational entities, for example, a dyad that links two previously
unconnected parts of a network. Actors or inter-organizational relations (IOR) in
this role can generate benefits for themselves which can translate into favourable
conditions in their exchanges with other actors (Burt 1992). Furthermore, having a
central position in the network can produce a favourable reputation which in turn
can lead to advantages in tie formation. For example, the fact that several scholars
find support for processes of homophily wherein more centrally positioned organi-
zations are more likely to form ties with organizations of similar status (Amburgey
and Al-Laham 2006). From a closure perspective (Coleman) third parties create so-
cial capital by improving information flow, making it possible to detect and punish
bad behaviour (Burt 2005). Recently, Burt suggested that the tension between these
two perspectives can be solved by integrating both mechanisms (e.g. brokerage and
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closure) in a broader model (Burt 2005). He suggests that bridging a structural
hole can create value if there is a closed network of a cohesive team around the
bridge. Structural holes are the empty spaces in a social structure which implies that
actors on either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of information.
Value is thus created in the case where a structurally autonomous group consists of
people strongly connected to one another, with extensive bridge relations beyond
the group.
The theory of embeddedness, as originally formulated by Granovetter (1985),
emphasizes that economic exchanges are embedded in social networks (see also
Jones and Lichtenstein, Chapter 9 this volume). They are neither purely role-based,
oversocialized behaviour, nor are they strictly instrumental rational, undersocial-
ized behaviour. Embeddedness refers to (1) that actors prefer to interact with family
members, friends, and acquaintances rather than with persons they do not know,
(2) that social ties are nested in other ties, and (3) that previous ties influence
the development of future ones (see Granovetter 1985, 1992, 2005; Swedberg 1994;
Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994).
For example, the embeddedness argument emphasizes mechanisms through
which informational advantages are produced. Relational embeddedness, which
essentially refers to the quality and depth of a single dyadic tie, stresses the impor-
tance of direct cohesive ties as a mechanism for obtaining fine-grained information
(Uzzi 1996). Actors that share direct connections are likely to possess comparable
knowledge and information, leading to shared understandings which influence
behaviours, imitation for example. Relational embeddedness can also be regarded
as the capacity for ties to carry information that decreases uncertainty levels and
produces trust between entities (Burt and Knez 1995). To summarize, relational
embeddedness can generate unique information on the capabilities and reliability
of other actors which are part of the network.
Structural embeddedness, on the other hand, stresses the informational value
of the structural positions that actors have in networks. Structural embeddedness
refers to the fact that organizations do not just have relationships with each other
but also with the same third parties. A consequence of which is that actors are
linked indirectly by third parties. The more structural embeddedness there is in
a network, the more information about each actor is known to all other actors.
Moreover, actors situated between distinct groupings can derive advantages from
their positions for themselves and can broker relationships among other players.
As such, benefits are created for the networks as a whole, by improving interim
coordination and information flow.
It is from the latter perspective that we will analyse the contribution of a network
approach to the study of inter-organizational relations. Through a comprehensive
review of the academic literature using Web of Science, we identified research on
inter-organizational relations in which a network perspective is prevalent. While
the phenomenon of formation of inter-organizational relations is addressed in that
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literature, other aspects of inter-organizational relations, such as their effectiveness,
have received very little attention. Consequently, this review only reflects what is
available in the literature and not what could be done. We will come back to that
later.
Tie Formation as a Consequence
of Networks
..........................................................................................................................................
Tie formation is the most commonly studied phenomenon within a network ap-
proach. This is understandable as scholars who have affinity with the network
perspective see the presence or absence of relationships as one of the main char-
acteristics of networks. The literature has identified a considerable number of
factors pertaining to why organizations form ties (see Oliver 1990; Ebers 1999). We
concentrate here specifically on the factors associated with the network approach.
How do networks influence whether a firm forms a link? In the literature two
distinct network approaches could be identified which explain why ties are formed:
embedded tie formation and non-local tie formation. We address these approaches
subsequently.
Embedded or Local Tie Formation
The idea of the embedded tie formation approach is that the characteristics of a par-
ticular network (also called local network) influence the likelihood of organizations
forming ties as well as the likelihood that two specific actors within that network
will form a relationship (Gulati 1995; Powell et al. 1996; Gulati and Gargulio 1999).
For example, Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) demonstrate that the study of inter-
firm cooperative agreements in the biotechnology industry requires an analysis of
the network as a whole because network formation is a result of two opposite forces:
the reproduction of the network structure as a general social capital source for
members of the network and the alteration of the network structure by entrepre-
neurs for their own benefit. They show that it is the amount of social capital, itself
a function of the firm’s position in the network, that explains the formation of new
relationships among biotechnology start-ups. It turns out that biotechnology start-
ups choose to increase firm relationships in order to increase their social capital
rather than to exploit structural holes for self-interest. The underlying rationale for
this strategy is that social capital is more valuable than maximizing entrepreneurial
opportunities. In other words, structural stability and mutual dependence in such
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networks is viewed as more important and would be jeopardized by self-interested
behaviour.
Other studies have found that the network structure is a repository of informa-
tion and therefore is used in deciding with whom to build a new tie in that risk
and uncertainty are fundamental to partner selection (Williamson 1975; Pfeffer and
Salançik 1978; Kogut 1988; Podolny 1994; Gulati 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). Or-
ganizations tend to select partners with whom they are familiar and on whom they
are likely to have rich information. A useful source of such information seems to
be the network in which the organizations are mutually embedded. Consequently,
organizations will choose relationships with partners within their own network.
In the literature it is argued that an organization can derive information from
the network in which it is embedded. The network embodies different sources of
information. Organizations can use information based on their direct relations in
the network, about the structure of the network or about the position of actors
within the network.
First, organizations have information on partners with whom they have, or
have had, a relationship, what has been called relational embeddedness (Gulati and
Gargiulo 1999). Repeated ties provide information on the capabilities, reliability,
and interests of potential partners and therefore what can be expected in future
interactions (Podolny 1994; Uzzi 1997; Walker et al. 1997; Axelrod 1984; Larson
1992; Gulati 1995). Although the network effect seems limited here as information
is mainly based on previous bilateral experiences, one could also argue that the
more experience an organization has had with existing network partners the more
likely it is that a new relationship will develop within the same network. Ahuja
(2000a) presents a convincing rationale for how different forms of capital, techni-
cal, commercial, or social, explain linkage formation. He demonstrates that all of
these forms of capital are inducements to linkage formation.
Second, organizations tend to select their partner’s partner (Burt and Knez 1995;
Baker 1990; Uzzi 1996), what has been called structural embeddedness (Gulati and
Gargiulo 1999). In contrast to the previous case, here a genuine network effect
exists. The frame of reference shifts from direct contacts to indirect channels of
information, reputation, and referral. Such information can only result from a
network structure. When organizations A and B share a common partner C, then
A and B are more likely to form a relationship between themselves as they see the
trust placed in each of them by C. In the absence of first-hand experience then,
information based on indirect linkages is seen as a good alternative (Podolny 1994;
Uzzi 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999).
The field-net approach is a further specification of the structural embeddedness
approach. It considers the structural characteristics of a network at time 1 to affect
tie formation at time 2 (Kenis and Knoke 2002). In this context, a field-net is defined
as the configuration of present and absent IORs among all the organizations that are
members of an organizational field. The field-net concept is a network application
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of the organizational field concept as developed by DiMaggio and Powell, who
stated that an organizational field comprises ‘those organizations that, in the ag-
gregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, produc-
ers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or
products’ (1983: 148). Primarily on the basis of theoretical insights and empirical
studies from the field of network analysis, they formulate propositions on how
density, reciprocity, confirmation of ties, connectivity, centralization, multiplexity,
cohesion, and network hierarchy affect tie formation within the field-net. The field-
net approach assumes that the macro-level configuration of inter-organizational
ties among field members serves as an opportunity structure that both constrains
and facilitates the potential actions of member organizations. Kenis and Knoke
(2002) emphasize how aggregate relations within a field-net can erect substantial
barriers to collective action, for example, that more centralized networks provide
fewer opportunities for peripheral participants to locate potential partners with
whom to forge new collaborative ties.
A third available source of information for partner selection is the network
position of potential partners, the so-called positional embeddedness (Gulati and
Gargiulo 1999). Positional embeddedness refers to the fact that the position of an
organization in a network influences its ability to access information about poten-
tial partners as well as its visibility and its attractiveness to other organizations. In
the absence of first-hand experience or recommendations by third parties, organi-
zations can make inferences about the quality of a potential partner (Podolny 1994;
Podolny and Phillips 1996). Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) have demonstrated that the
network position plays an important role in partner selection. The more central an
actor’s network position, the more likely that it will have better information about
a larger pool of potential partners, and hence that it will select a partner. At the
same time, central actors are themselves more attractive to potential partners as
their central position signals their willingness, experience, and ability to enter into
partnerships. This signalling property is found in research to be particularly impor-
tant in uncertain environments, because it presents reputational differences among
organizations that extend beyond their immediate circle of direct (as described by
relational embeddedness) and indirect ties (as described by structural embedded-
ness). Consequently, one can expect that organizations which have a similar central
position are more likely to build a new relationship among themselves.
In summary, being embedded in a network encourages an organization to co-
operate more with other member organizations as opposed to with those outside.
Hence networks are considered as a repository of information on the availability,
competencies, and reliability of prospective partners (Burt 1992; Kogut et al. 1992;
Gulati 1995; Powell et al. 1996).
Ahuja (2000a) has, however, emphasized that embeddedness exerts two con-
tradictory influences on a firm’s incentives to form linkages. On the one hand, a
history of dense linkages provides a firm with expertise in managing such linkages,
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but on the other, there could be saturation. Every linkage that embeds a firm
more deeply in the network also places a strain on its management and absorptive
capacity. Consequently Ahuja proposes a curvilinear relationship between the level
of embeddedness and tie formation.
Non-local Tie Formation
A second context in which ties form within a network approach is what we call non-
local ties. Non-local ties are ties with actors outside the network in order to expand
the network (Pfeffer and Salançik 1978) by incorporating new actors (see also Burt
1983; Gargiulo 1993), for example, to learn about new practices and technologies
(Kogut 1988; Powell et al. 1996). This perspective is somewhat in contrast to an
embeddedness perspective in which past interactions or the characteristics of the
local network play an important role.
This perspective can throw light on how firms that have not previously formed
relationships with other organizations, for example new entrants into an industry,
gain first entry into networks, a topic which has also been outside the purview
of extant empirical embeddedness studies. For example, Ozcan and Eisenhardt
(2006) find evidence for the fact that ties can form between firms with no prior
connection. In particular, firms with limited resources can form ties with promi-
nent partners if the latter can be approached in the early stages of an industry.
Early tie formation gives low-power firms the opportunity to collaborate with
prominent players in the co-creation of the market. In contrast, newcomers who
approach prominent firms later often find them too busy to pay any attention to
them. This research shows the importance of strategy, and particularly of tim-
ing, as important variables in explaining tie formation (Ozcan and Eisenhardt
2006).
In a study of the 300 largest US firms, Beckman, Haunschild, and Philips (2004)
have also empirically demonstrated the importance of non-local relationships, or
what they call relationships with strangers. At the same time they also identified
local relationships, or as they put it, relationships with friends. They demonstrate
in their analysis that firms form new relationships with new partners to explore and
that they form additional relationships with existing partners to exploit (March
1991). Whether exploration or exploitation is chosen depends on the uncertainty
that a firm is facing. This study relates to another variant of the non-local tie
formation perspective, the Small World tie formation perspective. This perspective
also points towards the phenomenon that previously unrelated actors form ties. It
is, however, more specific with regard to the type of non-local ties formed and the
reason why such ties are formed. The ties central in the small world tie formation
perspective are those formed between locally clustered networks. These are called
‘small world structures’ and refer to densely interconnected local substructures
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linked by a few intermediaries (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991; Kogut and Walker
2001; Baum et al. 2003; Davis et al. 2003; Powell et al. 2005; Burt 2005). The reasons
why ties are formed between such substructures is not accidentally or merely related
to instrumental considerations but is also related to social reasons. For example, the
reason why two actors (who are part of different substructures) are participating
in the same event and learn that the two have a mutual friend (‘Isn’t it a small
world?’) describes the often observed tendency for actors at geographically removed
locations to be connected through intermediaries.
Also the literature on interlocking directories has demonstrated the importance
of key intermediaries and the small world of companies in specific economies. An
interlocking directorate occurs when a person connected to one organization is a
member of the board of directors of another organization. Such intermediaries fa-
cilitate collusion (Pennings 1980), deal with interfirm resource dependencies (Boyd
1990), and are used to monitor inter-organizational behaviours and to exert power.
For example, a bank might stipulate that one of its own board members be put
on the board of a client with a high debt ratio for monitoring reasons. Finally,
interlocks with important organizations are formed to signal to other stakeholders,
for example investors, that the firm is a legitimate enterprise worthy of financial
support.
Ties between small worlds thus create channels for information exchange across
local clusters (Baum et al. 2005). They can transform a locally clustered network
into a small world in which any two members have short connecting paths (Watts
1999). These networks enable efficient access to diverse information across locally
clustered networks while maintaining the benefits of embedded ties within local
clusters.
There is little research that explains the small world characteristic of inter-
organizational networks. Baum et al. (2005) suggest that the effects of performance
feedback might explain such partnering strategy. In contrast to the classic embed-
ded relationship, this type of relationship is characterized by risk and uncertainty.
They demonstrate that organizations performing far from historical and social
aspirations are more willing to accept the uncertainty and risk of such non-local
ties with relative strangers. Inconsistent performance feedback triggers the greatest
risk in selecting partners. This conclusion cannot be considered as evidence in
favour of a network approach since in the first place it is attribute variables which
explain whether actors form ties or not. Nonetheless, the study is still important
in this context as it demonstrates that the characteristics of the local network
are not necessarily the dominant explanation for forming ties. The study is also
relevant because it explains that IORs result from forming ties between networks,
the rationale being that non-redundant ties can provide unique information and
can create opportunities to broker resource and information flows across previously
unconnected (clusters of) partners (Burt 1992, 2005; Ahuja 2000a; Rowley et al.
2000; Soda et al. 2004).
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The research presented above has mainly addressed the question of with whom
within their existing network an actor will form a relationship. It thus complements
the literature which explains the actual formation of networks by exogenous factors
such as the distribution of technological resources or the structure of resource
dependence (Pfeffer and Salançik 1978; Burt 1983). A network approach actually
challenges this literature since it provides an alternative explanation for tie for-
mation. Gulati (1999) introduced the concept of firm network resource. This is an
information resource which firms obtain from the inter-firm networks in which
they are located. The number of such resources available to firms can influence
their strategic behaviour because it alters their opportunity sets. In general, it is
argued that the richer the information, the larger the opportunity set available.
Consequently, one can show empirically that the extent to which firms enter into
new relationships is influenced by these resources. Gulati (1999) also has shown that
these network resources, measured by firms’ location in the inter-firm network of
prior ties in which they are embedded, are more important than other factors such
as the length of time since a firm had last entered into an alliance and the diversity
of their alliance portfolio in terms of governance structures used and nationalities
of partners involved. This might point to the fact that once firms have developed
the administrative control procedures for creating new alliances, they are able to
use that knowledge in any kind of alliance.
Tie Termination
..........................................................................................................................................
Tie termination is as interesting as tie formation, and yet it has prompted very little
research from a social network perspective (Gulati 1998). Just as there is in the
network literature an analytical bias towards the presence of relationships to the
detriment of the absence of relationships, there also seems to be a bias towards
the formation of ties compared to their termination. Nevertheless, the termination
of ties is as important as their formation, especially since both are affected by the
performance of organizations. Tie termination is also important for understanding
partnering behaviour and network dynamics (Podolny and Page 1988; Uzzi 1996).
From a theoretical point of view, whether the theories that explain the formation of
ties can also explain their termination is also of interest.
There are several reasons why tie termination has received less attention from
scholars in the field. First, there is a construct validity problem: tie failure and tie
termination are often not distinguished. However, there is a difference between nat-
ural and untimely tie terminations. Many successful IORs are terminated because
partners have planned to do so from the very start. Moreover, an IOR might be
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used as a transitional organizational arrangement that is terminated as soon as its
goals are accomplished or when the participating partners have new information
that makes an acquisition feasible (Balakrishnan and Koza 1993). Furthermore, not
all ongoing IORs are successful. Some may be continuing because of inertia or high
exit costs associated with tie termination (Kim et al. 2006).
Second, there is an internal validity problem that results from the dyadic nature
of IORs. Several scholars argue that the developmental process of dyadic inter-
organizational relationships impact on how these relationships emerge, evolve, and
dissolve. More specifically, they propose that imbalances in this process impact on
the probability of tie termination. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) state that tie termi-
nation is a result of imbalances between actors, for example due to alternations in
organizational commitment. However, Chen and Chen (2002) show that in IORs
between organizations located in developed and emerging economies, imbalances
in the actual distribution of outcomes are regarded as part of the deal due to the
different motives the partners have when entering an IOR and thus do not increase
the probability of tie termination.
Despite these difficulties, several scholars have studied the termination of IORs
from a network perspective. There is some evidence that IORs with more embedded
ties may perform better or last longer than those without. Kogut (1989) found
that IORs between partners with a prior history of ties are less likely to terminate.
Levinthal and Fichman (1988) and Seabright, Levinthal, and Fichman (1992) found
that IOR duration is not only influenced by changes in resources dependencies but
also by higher levels of relational embeddedness in the network. This embeddedness
leads to tie persistence because actors have a shared history of collaboration. How-
ever, the few studies that have addressed tie termination from a network perspective
focus predominantly on the effects of relational embeddedness. Therefore, we know
little about the impact of structural embeddeness on termination.
One study that looks at the relationship between structural embeddedness and
tie termination is that of Amburgey and Al-Laham (2006). They specify different
types of tie failure, namely the failure of a tie that is (a) a bridging tie, which is a tie
that connects two components in a network; (b) a pendant tie, one which is between
a firm and a firm with high centrality not in the network; (c) an intra-component
tie, which is a tie in a component of a network; and (d) a dyad. Moreover, they
distinguish network components, which are parts of a network in which actors
are actually connected. Next, they relate these different types of tie failure to the
structural cohesion or density of a network component and formulate a number
of hypotheses which can be summarized as follows: The higher the density level of
a network component, that is the higher the ratio of actual ties to the number of
possible ties, the higher the likelihood of tie termination of (a) a bridging tie; (b) a
dyad; (c) a pendant tie. However, the likelihood of so-called component-thinning
terminations, for example, terminations within a network component, increases
with the number of intra-component ties. These hypotheses were tested with a
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longitudinal research design including biotechnology R&D alliances in the USA
and Germany. With the exception of the hypothesis on the termination of pendant
ties, all hypotheses were empirically confirmed. These findings highlight the notion
that changes in the structure of networks clearly have an impact on tie termination
rates.
Tie Functioning and Network Effects
..........................................................................................................................................
The functioning of IORs has also been rarely studied from a network perspective.
By functioning we mean the management, monitoring, and control of ties (see also
Hibbert et al. Chapter 15 this volume). The major assumption is that the factors
that have a positive influence on tie formation will also have a positive effect on
their functioning. Repeated ties also contribute to the development of a common
language and common routines that facilitate the joint planning, rich information
exchange, and conflict resolution skills required for successful partnerships (Mohr
and Spekman 1996; Simonin 1997; Inkpen and Dinur 1998; Zollo et al. 2002).
Repeated ties also facilitate the collective monitoring and sanctioning of deviant
behaviour among partners, which fosters a concern for local reputation (Burt and
Knez 1995, Rowley 1997; Walker et al. 1997).
It is clear that this is an unsatisfactory situation. The simple fact that the majority
of ties which emerge are terminated after some time because they are dysfunctional
shows that the factors that positively influence the formation of ties must be differ-
ent from those that explain their functioning.
As suggested by Gulati (1999: 415), it could be the case that ‘network resources
resulting from the network of prior alliances not only provide powerful enabling
conditions for firms to enter new alliances, it can also have consequences for the
relative success of individual alliances the firm enters’. It would indeed be interesting
to compare IORs which result from an embeddedness rationale with IORs which
have been formed on the basis of another rationale in order to see whether these
vary in functioning and effectiveness.
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2006) have demonstrated that strong portfolios, for
example a diversified egocentric network of alliances, are those which have re-
dundant ties. Entrepreneurial firms in a nascent market are more likely to build
a strong portfolio if they manage ties with several firms of each type. These help
to provide information and maintain alternative courses of action. Basically, this
finding relates to the discussion in the literature on trade-offs between the number
and the strength of ties. Hansen (1999) suggested that a unit can have either a
high number of weak ties or a low number of strong ties. Ozcan and Eisenhardt
found that firms with strong tie portfolios only work intensively with their most
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active partners while creating through frequent communication the appearance of
interest with their other partners. They call this the sequential-attention approach.
Another factor mentioned here is that a strong portfolio is related to avoiding ties
with competitors. Such ties are inherently unstable and if the relationships are
terminated, the negative effect of the relationship on the rest of the portfolio is
often not easily undone.
Another issue which has received attention in this context is tie depth, which
refers to the level of interaction taking place within ties. There are only a few studies
which consider tie depth and how it evolves over time. Larson (1992) and Doz (1996)
show that tie depth grows over time as partners build mutual trust. Ozcan and
Eisenhardt (2006) confirm this finding but also observe that deep ties can become
shallow over time. When a tie becomes insignificant to one of the partners, that
partner may decide to decrease the level of interaction rather than discontinue the
relationship altogether. The tie can be revitalized at a later stage. Another finding of
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2006) confirming the network approach is that ties do not
only become deep due to the improvements in the relationship between partners,
but also because they evolve along with other ties in the network. Ties of different
types evolve along with other ties based on the interdependence between them.
Ozcan and Eisenhardt show that low-power firms are able to maintain strong port-
folios, for instance portfolios with deep ties to many prominent members, which
help them to overcome their disadvantages, attract other prominent partners, and
increase their sales. As a result, they are able to improve their structural position in
the network, that is, they become more central.
The above relates to the more general issue of the effects of networks on their
member organizations. Participating in a network provides members of IORs with
opportunities for sharing a variety of resources. As network ties are conduits of
information transmission, they give organizations trusted information that affects
their behaviours. This information could lead to imitation of practices (Henisz and
Delios 2001), the speeding-up of, even widely known, practices (Gibbons 2004).
Adoption by network members is amplified by similarity of characteristics of orga-
nizations in networks as similar organizations are evaluated as more relevant and
easier to learn from.
Networks can be seen as collective knowledge and information sources (Gulati
et al. 2002). These sources can be utilized by IOR members to increase their in-
novation and learning capabilities (Ingram and Baum 1997; Dyer and Nobeoka
2000), or their innovative performance by participating in dense networks that give
access to tacit knowledge (Ahuja 2000b) or by making use of structural holes in net-
works which provide novel information (Baum et al. 2000) (see also, Nooteboom,
Chapter 23 this volume). Empirical evidence indicates that the innovative perfor-
mance of firms is further strengthened if they are part of networks, which are
spatially clustered (Saxenian 1994; Oerlemans and Meeus 2005) (see also, Yeung,
Chapter 18 this volume).
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As is evidenced by research, network membership impacts on firm survival rates
(see also Lomi et al., Chapter 12 this volume). Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson
(2004) show, for example, that ties have a positive influence on the probabilities
of survival of newly founded firms and on firms implementing radical change
(Miner et al. 1990). Being related to network members with high status affects
organizational survival in a positive way (Baum and Oliver 1991) as it increases
legitimacy levels. Uzzi’s research (1996) showed that firms with a high proportion of
embedded ties experienced lower failure rates as compared to firms with mixtures
of arm’s-length and embedded ties.
There are also indications that relational and structural embeddedness affects
firm performance in a positive way. As network ties can be interpreted as signals
of quality that confer status on a firm, strong ties could result in higher product
(Podolny 1994) or stock prices (Stuart et al. 1999). Moreover, ties established as
informal financial arrangements give IOR members access to financial resources
which enables them to increase financial performance and productivity (Keister
1998). As far as indicators of structural embeddedness are concerned, the research
by Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) shows that network centrality and al-
liance experience increased the growth rate of biotechnology start-ups, whereas
organizations generate higher returns when they have a broker position between
disconnected others (Bae and Gargiulo 2004).
It has to be noted that the majority of the literature is biased towards studying
the positive organizational effects of networks. However, networks may also con-
strain participants and have negative performance effects. Being part of a network
might lead to lock-in effects, lowering the informational value of the network
(Gomes-Casseres 1994) or increasing inertia and resistance to change (Kim et al.
2006). Moreover, network ties also can be conduits for the unintended transfer of
valuable knowledge and intellectual capital to other network members (Sampson
2004).
Tie Dynamics and Feedback
..........................................................................................................................................
One of the most important and interesting discussions in which the IOR phenom-
enon is closely intertwined with a network approach centres on the fact that the
formation or termination will lead at the same time to a change of the overall
network. The reason for this is that the structural configuration of a network is
defined by the presence and absence of IORs. Consequently, a network approach
not only allows, but actually requires, a dynamic perspective. IORs follow a cyclical
pattern—network change leads to IOR change, which in turn leads to network
change, and so on. Consequently, we expect network dynamics to exert a powerful
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influence on IORs and to be an object of study in its own right (see also Cropper
and Palmer, Chapter 24 this volume).
Most studies taking a network approach to IORs consider network dynamics to
be an important phenomenon, although they do not look at it in a systematic way.
For example, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) propose a model in which the formation
of inter-organizational networks is the evolutionary outcome of socially embedded
organizational action. Their model provides a systematic link between the social
structure of an organizational field—understood in network terms—and the be-
haviour of organizations within the field. They show the link to be bidirectional.
On one hand, the emerging social structure progressively shapes organizational
decisions about whether and with whom to create new ties. On the other hand,
this social structure is produced by the decisions of individual organizations to
establish relations with one another. Gulati and Gargiulo convincingly show that
IORs not only result from exogenous drivers such as interdependence but also from
exogenous evolutionary dynamics triggered by the very way in which organizations
select potential partners. The dialectic between action and structure is at the core
of this social process. The propositions formulated by Kenis and Knoke (2002) also
show that they expect endogenous dynamics to play an important role. For exam-
ple, when the density of a field-net is low, so is the tie formation rate. As density
increases, the tie formation rate accelerates in response to increased opportunities
for collaboration. Finally, as the network reaches saturation, the tie formation rate
declines and eventually declines to zero.
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2006) pointed to the dynamics of clusters in networks.
They demonstrated that co-evolution of complementary ties, as a result of simulta-
neously negotiating with complementary partners and the competition of similar
ties, contributes to the structural evolution of the network through the formation
and change of clusters. Both forces are opposing because the co-evolution of com-
plementary ties creates a cluster around large and complementary nodes in the
network while the competition of similar ties selects out the small nodes and pushes
them towards the periphery. This constant push and pull around the large nodes
gives the network momentum.
A Critical Evaluation of the
Contribution of Network Analysis
to the Analysis of IORs
..........................................................................................................................................
We have seen that while the network perspective is alive in the literature on IORs,
only a limited number of issues and phenomena have been addressed. Formation
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of ties is the issue that has received the most attention and alliance formation is the
phenomenon most studied. This can be good news as it leaves room for unrealized
potential, but it could also be bad news because it might be an indication of the
limitation of what can be studied with this perspective.
Nevertheless, on the basis of what has been studied so far, we can comfortably
say that a network approach has the potential of being important to the study
and analysis of IORs. This being said, it is also clear that we are far from having
a general network theory of IORs. Although network embeddedness often seems to
play a role, almost every study introduces different and new independent variables
or introduces intermediary or moderator variables. What we can say with certainty
is that the network approach carries us beyond the observation that relationships
between actors are simply a result of market rationales, of the interdependence
between actors, or of some other actor attribute such as size, age, scope, or resource
endowment.
The strength of the network approach is that it cannot only provide an alternative
explanation for why actors form ties but also explain with whom actors form
ties. Whereas other approaches such as transaction cost economics or resource
dependence theory emphasize the fact that organizations create ties to manage
environmental uncertainty and to satisfy their resource needs, a network approach
is particularly useful in explaining with whom organizations enter such ties and
how these actions are related to informational and control benefits.
Another interesting finding is that there is no doubt that actors are always embed-
ded in networks of some kind. Consequently, what must be addressed with a net-
work approach is the type of networks that is most likely to lead to tie formation and
tie selection. This implies that the network must be considered as a variable and not
only as an alternative governance form. Discussions often revolve around networks,
markets, and hierarchies as distinct governance structures, but it is more important
to consider the network as a variable, given that they come in all kinds of forms (see
Grandori and Soda 1995; Provan and Kenis 2005). Second, besides the presence of
actors in networks of a certain form, other conditions seem to determine whether
the network variable has an influence or not. Several moderator variables have been
identified which determine whether the network in which actors are embedded
affects their relational behaviour. For example Beckman, Haunschild, and Philips
(2004) have demonstrated that it does make a difference whether an actor forms
a new relationship for exploitation or exploration. Actors seem to acknowledge
differences between arm’s length and embedded ties (Uzzi 1997).
It also becomes clear, however, that the development of a network approach to
IOR has to cope with a number of limitations. It seems that empirical studies are
biased to such cases where it is easy to operationalize whether an alliance is present
or not and whether a given tie occurs or not. For example, this seems to be the main
reason why studies of these dependent variables are so prominent in the literature.
The question is, of course, to what extent the findings from the alliance literature
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can be generalized to other forms of cooperation and coordination between orga-
nizations.
Another issue complicating the development of a network approach is that
distinguishing between the attributes of organizations and their relational char-
acteristics is a complicating factor in assessing the explanatory strength of such an
approach. For example, technological prestige is a network variable because it is en-
gendered by flows of deterrence between firms, and so it has relational foundations
(Podolny et al. 1996). But the reason for these flows of deterrence is, at least in part,
that an organization has contributed an ongoing stream of notable innovations.
Hence, the positional variable ‘prestige’ and the attribute variable ‘capability’ are
closely related.
Another complicating factor might be that the relationship between characteris-
tics of the network and IORs need not be linear, although this is the assumption in
most studies. Earlier research has pointed to the possibility of overembeddedness
(Burt 1982; Gargiulo and Benassi 2000; Uzzi 1997), which refers to a situation where
all firms in a network are connected through strong or embedded ties.
One of the other problems with the explanatory power of a network approach
is that it is not always clear where the network starts and where the network ends.
For example, is the formation of non-local ties a confirmation or a refutation of
the network approach? On one hand one could argue that the simple fact that the
relation does not develop within the network disproves the network approach. On
the other hand, one could argue that whether an actor is considered to be non-local
or not is completely contingent on the definition of the boundaries of the network.
It is here where the difference between an embeddedness approach and a net-
work approach becomes clear. An embeddedness perspective is broadly concerned
with how social and economic structures govern economic exchanges (Granovetter
1985), whereas a network approach, although based on the same starting point, is at
the same time more specific and more general. It is more specific in that it points
towards the importance of networks of relationships, which, once formed, shape
the establishment of relationships in future periods. It is more general in that it can
surpass the embeddedness perspective by including previously non-existing, non-
local, or brokerage ties.
In order to continue to formulate a network theory of IORs (e.g., one where
specific characteristics of IORs are the result of network characteristics) we must
specify how, why, and when we would expect a relationship between attributes of
embeddedness and networks and attributes of IORs (Whetten 1989). To conclude
we will present some future directions which could be instrumental in such an
endeavour. The variation in operationalizations of the independent variable, the
network, could be reduced by concentrating on the portfolio of relationships rather
than on a single or even a couple of specific relationships. Studies tend to choose
different ties in the operationalization of the networks and this reduces compara-
bility between the studies. Portfolios of relationships would be more comparable.
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Moreover, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2006) suggest that the portfolio of relationships
has more explanatory power than the individual relationship.
Our review has also shown that the network context which influences the for-
mation, termination, and functioning of IORs can be described along classical
network dimensions, in terms of relational, structural, or positional embeddedness
or potentially also using the distinction between structural, cognitive, political, and
cultural embeddedness proposed by Zukin and DiMaggio (1990). An interesting
question then becomes how these different forms of embeddedness are related to
each other and whether they have a different explanatory power for the study of
IORs. Moreover, Hagedoorn (2006) suggested ordering forms of embeddedness
on a vertical dimension. He distinguishes between environmental, network, and
dyadic embeddedness and points out that in particular the interactions between
these different levels can explain the prevalence of IORs.
Last but not least, a network approach to IORs not only increases our under-
standing of IORs but also contributes to strengthening the network approach itself.
Network research suffers from the conspicuous deficiency that the process of net-
work formation and transformation are underspecified (Emirbayer and Goodwin
1994; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Kenis and Knoke 2002; Madhavan et al. 1998).
Studies tend to apply network-theoretic arguments at the level of the network
to explain the generation of future networks. A logical step is to expand these
arguments to include the broader set of factors that are likely to influence network
formation and to explicitly recognize the motivations and ability of actors in the
network (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). It is especially at the level of the IOR
that these motivations and abilities can be observed and studied.
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